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Understanding the DSM-5: Stasis and change 
 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to understand the DSM-5 through situating it within the context of 
the historical development of the DSM series. When one looks at the sets of diagnostic 
criteria, the DSM-5 is strikingly similar to the DSM-IV. I argue that at this level the DSM has 
become ‘locked-in’ and difficult to change.  At the same time, at the structural, or conceptual, 
level there have been radical changes, for example, in the definition of ‘mental disorder’, the 
role of theory and of values, and in the abandonment of multiaxial approach to diagnosis. The 
way that the DSM-5 was constructed means that the overall conceptual framework of the 
classification only barely constrains the sets of diagnostic criteria that it contains. 
 










The much awaited fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5) was published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 2013 (APA, 
2013). When one looks at the list of disorders included, and at the sets of diagnostic criteria, 
the DSM-5 is strikingly similar to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). At the same time, at the 
structural, or conceptual, level there have been radical changes; for example, the definition of 
‘mental disorder’, which delimits the scope of the classification, is importantly different, and 
the multiaxial approach to diagnosis, characteristic of earlier editions of the DSM, has been 
abandoned. 
This paper aims to understand the DSM-5 through situating it within the context of the 
historical development of the DSM series. The first section, ‘Stasis’, considers why it is that 
the DSM-IV and DSM-5 are so similar in the disorders they include, and in the sets of 
diagnostic criteria. Of course, a few changes have been made, and those changes are 
important; the DSM is now so influential that even the smallest revisions can potentially 
affect the lives of millions world-wide. Still, considered overall, when it comes to the 
diagnostic criteria there is largely stasis. In a piece introducing the new edition, David Kupfer 
and Darrel Regier, who chaired the revision process, tell readers ‘by and large, there were not 
sweeping changes in the diagnostic criteria for most disorders’ (Regier, Kuhl and Kupfer, 
2013).  
At the same time, at the structural, or conceptual, level much has changed. The second 
section of the paper, ‘Change’, considers four key revisions: (1) the multiaxial approach to 
diagnosis has been abandoned, (2) the definition of mental disorder, included in the 
introduction, has been revised, (3) the DSM-5 embraces theory, while earlier editions sought 
to be atheoretical, (4) ethical questions have been systematically considered in revising the 
classification for the first time. Thus at the conceptual, meta-, level the DSM-5 and the DSM-
IV are importantly different.  
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This then raises a question: how is it that the conceptual framework of the DSM can be 
radically revised while the diagnostic criteria that it contains remain the same? In the third 
section of the paper, ‘Looseness’, I shall argue that the way that the DSM-5 was constructed 
means that the overall conceptual framework of the classification only barely constrains the 
sets of diagnostic criteria that it contains.  
 
1. Stasis 
I will argue that the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 are similar to those in the DSM-IV 
because it has become difficult to change them. With recent editions of the DSM, revision 
takes many years, costs millions of dollars, and involves hundreds of experts working in 
many workgroups and subcommittees.  The chairs of the DSM-5 Task Force, David Kupfer 
and Darrel Regier, were appointed by the APA in 2006 and oversaw the process of 
constructing the DSM-5 (APA, 2013: 6). Workgroups of specialists worked on the various 
sections of the manual (mood disorders, substance-related disorders, and so on). Each 
workgroup reviewed relevant literature published since publication of the DSM-IV, drafted 
proposals for revisions to diagnostic criteria in their area, and then solicited and responded to 
feedback on their proposals. Throughout the revision period, mental health conferences and 
journals were full of discussion about proposals for revision. Draft versions of the DSM-5 
were periodically posted online, and anyone who wished could contact the workgroups with 
their ideas and suggestions. Field trials, where clinicians used draft criteria to check they 
could be reliably applied, were used to test some draft diagnostic criteria. Behind the scenes, 
various interest groups (representing different types of therapist, and patient, but also 
business groups) lobbied the APA in attempts to get the classification to fit their interests. 
Finally, the DSM had to be voted through by the various committees of the APA. The 
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revision process was lengthy, and involved many distinct actors. As a consequence, the initial 
plan for the new edition, and the finished product, could markedly diverge. 
In the case of the DSM-5, a radical reshaping of the classification was initially proposed. A 
Research Agenda for DSM-V (the Latin numerals only changed later) set out the ambitions 
(Kupfer, First and Regier, 2002). A Research Agenda began by detailing problems with the 
DSM series to date. The DSM-III, published in 1980, sought to be a purely descriptive 
classification that made no use of unproven theoretical assumptions (APA, 1980:6-8). In the 
late 1970s (when the DSM-III was under construction) many researchers believed that the 
unreliability of diagnosis was holding back research.  The descriptive diagnostic criteria of 
the DSM-III were designed in part to improve the reliability of diagnosis.  The idea was that 
once syndromes could be reliably identified, research could be expected to make progress in 
identifying the causes of psychopathology. Since DSM-III, however, research into the causes 
of psychopathology has failed to live up to expectations.  A Research Agenda outlined how 
the descriptive syndromes included in the DSM may now be slowing progress. Many 
researchers suspect that theoretically interesting populations will likely not map on to DSM 
categories.  A Research Agenda agreed that researchers thus need a different style of 
classification. It was left unclear exactly what sort of classification might be better, however, 
and A Research Agenda concluded that some ‘as yet unknown paradigm shift may need to 
occur.’ (Kupfer, First and Regier, 2002: xix).  
In the event, seeking to construct a radically different sort of classification proved too 
ambitious.  Partly this was because the exciting research breakthroughs that A Research 
Agenda saw on the horizon - in genetics, neuroscience, developmental science, and so on - 
failed to produce results quickly enough to inform a new classification.  But, even in cases 
where researchers agreed that there was sufficient evidence for change, it turned out to be 
unexpectedly hard to revise the sets of diagnostic criteria included in the DSM. At the end of 
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the process, co-chair David Kupfer, described it as ‘an aggressive, conservative document’; 
in his view the committees were aggressive in their pursuit of revision, but conservative in 
their decisions in the end (Levine, 2013). Commentators agree that the sets of diagnostic 
criteria in the DSM-5 and DSM-IV are highly similar (Aragona, 2015; Paris, 2015: 52; 
Poland, 2015: 34). In this section, I shall argue that diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-5 
have become hard to revise because classifications such as the DSM are ‘path dependent’ and 
the DSM has become ‘locked-in’. 
The QWERTY keyboard layout is the classic example of technological path dependence 
leading to lock-in (David, 1985). Currently, the QWERTY layout is nearly universally used, 
but the reasons for this are historical. When keys were mechanical, QWERTY was the design 
that reduced the chances of physically adjacent keys being pressed in succession and so 
jamming together. Typists trained on a QWERTY keyboard found it not worth their while to 
shift to any other. Nowadays, keyboards no longer jam, and if keyboards were being 
introduced de novo it is likely that a different design (such as Dvorak) would enable faster 
typing. Still, given that use of QWERTY is established, the costs of moving to a different 
layout are too great. QWERTY has become ‘locked-in’. 
 
I suggest that when classification systems come to be employed widely, by diverse actors, 
and where their continued existence relies on those actors continuing to be satisfied, they 
become prone to lock-in. To see how the diagnostic criteria included in the DSM have come 
to be locked-in, we need to consider the multiple users of the DSM, and how their needs 
constrain the classification.  
 
Most straightforwardly, the DSM is a classification produced by and for the members of the 
American Psychiatric Association. Once developed by the various work groups and Task 
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Force, the draft DSM has to be agreed by various APA committees before it is accepted.  The 
DSM thus has to be broadly acceptable to its members. Some members are researchers, most 
are clinicians. This gives rise to diverse requirements, for example clinicians tend to prefer 
simpler classifications than researchers (Mullins-Sweatt, Lengel and DeShong, 2016). 
Members of other mental health professions in the US also commonly use the DSM. They 
buy copies in large part because they use codes from the book for the filling in insurance 
forms (Frazer et al., 2009). These buyers are numerous, and sales to them are important for 
the APA’s finances. Between 2005 and 2011 the APA earned $5-6 million each year from 
sales of the DSM-IV (Treasurer, 2012). 
Research in mental health typically employs DSM criteria. The use of the DSM in research 
cements the scientific respectability of the DSM. As a consequence, it is advantageous to the 
APA that the DSM be broadly acceptable to mental health researchers around the world. 
The World Health Organization publishes its own classification – the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). The ICD covers all health conditions, but includes a chapter 
on mental disorders. Over the last few decades, the development of the DSM and the ICD has 
been coordinated, and the two classifications are now nearly identical (APA 1994: xx-xxi). 
The compatibility of the ICD with the DSM helps to ensure the respectability of the DSM as 
‘the’ classification of mental disorders.  
Non-mental health professionals and the lay public rely on the DSM to define mental 
disorders, and conversely normality.  DSM categories feature in legislation and the guidelines 
of many bureaucracies (particularly in the US, but also around the world). The APA is 
sensitive to public criticism of psychiatry,
1
  and is thus motivated to attempt to ensure that the 
DSM continues to appear respectable in the eyes of lay people. 
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Of course many of those who use the DSM are not completely satisfied with the system and 
grumble about it. But they continue to use the classification because it is ‘good enough’ for 
their purposes. I shall show that revising the diagnostic criteria while ensuring that the DSM 
continues to be ‘good enough’ for all its users has become extremely difficult.  
 
Dense networks of uses lead to constraints 
Let’s consider the constraints that can be created by the interconnections between the DSM, 
US medical insurance, the ICD, the needs of service users, and legislation. The DSM is used 
by many mental health professionals in the US for completing forms that are required for 
insurance coverage. Keeping the insurance industry on board places some constraints of the 
DSM – most obviously a very radical expansion of the domain of mental illness would 
threaten continued use of the system. To ensure that insurance companies continue to be 
satisfied with codes taken from the DSM it is not sufficient to simply check with insurers if 
they are happy with any proposed revisions. The codes included in the DSM used on 
insurance forms are actually ICD codes. ICD codes are mandatory because they are required 
by the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996). This means that for 
sales of the DSM to be ensured, the codes in it have to be compatible with ICD codes. The 
DSM and ICD cannot diverge very far from each other before this ceases to be the case. 
To make matters complicated, the US does not use the standard version of the ICD, but a 
‘clinical modification’ developed especially for use in the US. Development of the US 
modification lags years behind the revision schedule of the ICD. The World Health 
Organization published the ICD-10 in 1990, but the US version of this system was not ready 
until 2014. This delay meant that the DSM-5 had to be broadly compatible with different 
versions of the ICD. An APA website explains 
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DSM-5 contains both ICD-9-CM codes for immediate use and ICD-10-CM codes 
in parentheses. The inclusion of ICD-10-CM codes facilitates a cross-walk to the 
new coding system that will be implemented on October 1, 2014 for all US health 
care providers and systems, as recommended by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention’s National Center for Health Statistics (CDC-NCHS) and the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). (no author, 2013) 
But the complications are not yet done. The US has only just moved to ICD-10, but the rest 
of the world has moved on. ICD-11 is due to be published by WHO in 2018. Compatibility 
with this version is also a prerequisite to ensure long-term use of the DSM. The APA staff 
work ‘closely with staff from the WHO, CMS, and CDC-NCHS to ensure that the two 
systems are maximally compatible’ (no author, 2013). 
Concerns about maintaining viability for insurance constrain the general structure of the 
DSM – which has to maintain compatibility with the ICD. Insurance concerns can also limit 
revision at the level of individual diagnoses. In the DSM-5 the constraints are clearly visible 
if one considers the revisions that have been made to the autism–related disorders. 
In DSM-5 a number of previously distinct autism-related conditions have been merged to 
create a new category of autistic spectrum disorder (ASD). In DSM-5, ASD includes most of 
those diagnosed under DSM-IV with autism and most of those diagnosed with Asperger’s 
disorder. The change was justified on the basis that the supposed distinction between Autism 
and Asperger’s was of questionable significance, and in any case could not be reliably drawn 
(Happé, 2011).  
Having a diagnosis of Asperger’s or autism often makes a large difference to someone’s life. 
In the United States children with such diagnoses can often be entitled to very expensive 
forms of one-to-one therapy. Importantly, such provision is often conditional on the 
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diagnosis; if the diagnosis goes so does the support. When the classification alters, certain 
changes make little difference, but others can have a huge effect. For someone who had a 
diagnosis of Asperger’s under DSM-IV to be relabelled as having ASD would likely be of 
little consequence. This would merely be seen as a renaming of the same condition. What 
would be far more problematic would be if someone with a DSM-IV Asperger’s diagnosis 
was to end up with no mental disorder label, or a label with very different connotations – say, 
a speech disorder. In such a case a child would be at risk of losing their access to therapy.  
During the period of DSM-5 development, the potential effects of the proposed revisions to 
autism-related disorders were hotly contested.  The difficulty in estimating the effects of 
proposed changes arose because multiple small changes to the criteria were to be 
implemented simultaneously. In the DSM-IV, the main difference between children with 
autism and with Asperger’s was that those with Asperger’s showed no significant delays in 
early language skills. In merging the disorders, in DSM-5, the criteria relating to problems 
with language development, previously included in the DSM-IV as symptoms of autism, have 
been removed. Other changes were also made, for example, in the age by which symptoms 
must be manifest.  
A number of studies using draft DSM-5 criteria predicted that a significant number of those 
diagnosed with Asperger’s under DSM-IV would not receive a diagnosis of ASD under 
DSM-5. Instead, some would receive a diagnosis of ‘pragmatic speech disorder’, a diagnosis 
with very different connotations (Matson et al, 2012; Mattila et al, 2011).  
Autism groups are well informed and well organised, and were alert to the potential 
ramifications of changes to DSM criteria on service provision.  They came together to protest 
against the proposed revisions, and to argue that broad definitions of ASD should be 
maintained (Greenberg, 2013: 296-299). Politicians were drawn into the disputes. In a 
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number of States, legislation was proposed to ensure that all those with DSM-IV diagnoses 
would continue to be eligible for services (Connecticut General Assembly, 2013; Illinois 
General Assembly, 2013). 
Eventually the DSM committees back-tracked. The published DSM-5 includes a note. After 
the new diagnostic criteria for ASD, the note states that, 
 Individuals with a well-established DSM-IV diagnosis of autistic disorder, 
Asperger’s disorder, or pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified 
should be given the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (APA, 2013: 51).  
Given that there are clear differences between the old diagnostic criteria and the new, this 
note is extraordinary. In effect it says that some people who do not meet the diagnostic 
criteria for ASD should still be given the diagnosis.   
In the case of ASD, we can see that it has not been possible to revise the DSM and also to 
produce a revision that will be ‘good enough’ to satisfy the needs of its various users. The 
note has been inserted to satisfy patients and their supporters, and maybe it will enable people 
diagnosed with Asperger’s under DSM-IV to retain access to services.  But it seems 
inconceivable that these instructions could be employed by researchers seeking to investigate 
ASD. It would make no sense to select a subject population for research consisting of people 
who meet DSM-5 criteria for ASD, plus a few who do not but who satisfy DSM-IV criteria 
for Asperger’s. Here attempts to keep diverse groups satisfied have resulted in a botched 
definition.  
It is true that in the case of ASD revisions have been made to the DSM, thus this is not a pure 
case of ‘lock-in’. Still, I take the fact that the revision could only be done clumsily to 
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illustrate well how the DSM has become highly resistant to revision. Revision has become 
difficult and here the strains show. 
The personality disorders section of the DSM-5 provides another clear example that 
illustrates how hard it has become to revise the sets of diagnostic criteria included in the 
DSM. Early on in the revision process the dominant view amongst researchers was that the 
DSM should shift towards a dimensional system for personality disorders and a radically 
revised classification for personality disorders was proposed (Skodol et al., 2011). There 
were fears, however, that the proposed new system would be hard to clinicians to use in 
practice (Skodol et al.,2013). It proved impossible to find a satisfactory compromise that 
balanced the needs of both researchers and clinicians in time. Eventually, attempts at revision 
were abandoned, and the DSM-5 personality disorder section simply reprints the diagnostic 
criteria from DSM-IV. 
I conclude that at the level of diagnostic criteria the DSM-5 is very similar to the DSM-IV, 
because at this level the DSM has become locked-in.  It has become very difficult to make 
revisions and keep all users of the system on board, and so revisions have been avoided.  
 
2. Change 
At the structural, or conceptual, level the DSM-5 differs from earlier editions in important 
respects. Here I discuss a number of key changes that have been selected to be sufficient to 
demonstrate that significant change has occurred. 
i. Multiaxial diagnosis abandoned 
At the structural level the most obvious change between the DSM-5 and earlier editions is 
that the multiaxial diagnostic system has been abandoned. In DSM-IV, a complete diagnosis 
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involved attention to five axes. Diagnostic criteria for axis I (clinical mental disorders) and 
axis II (pervasive psychological issues, such as mental retardation and personality disorders) 
were provided within the DSM-IV itself. Axis III recorded potentially relevant general 
medical conditions (using ICD codes). Axis IV noted psychosocial and environmental 
problems. These were to be selected from a possible list, for example, ‘Problem related to the 
social environment: living alone’, or ‘Occupational problems:  discord with boss’. Axis V 
recorded a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF). The GAF score varied from 0 (worst) 
to 100 (best) and gave an indication of the patient’s overall level of functioning. In practice, 
many clinicians failed to record information on all five axes. While those who employed the 
DSM always used axis I, some used only this, and many used only axes I to III. Still, while 
they may not have always been employed, a complete DSM diagnosis required information 
on all five axes. 
In DSM-5, these axes are gone. Clinicians are now instructed to document the DSM 
diagnostic criteria that a patient meets and any relevant non-psychiatric medical conditions 
(2013: 16). There is no longer a distinction drawn between Axis I (primary mental disorders) 
and axis II (mental retardation and personality disorders).  Clinicians can also record social 
and environmental problems that may be relevant (and ICD codes are listed in the DSM to 
facilitate this). It is left unclear whether clinicians should also be recording level of disability; 
the introduction tells clinicians that there is now a ‘separate’ (i.e. non-DSM) notation for 
documentation of disability, and then a few lines later says that this system (the WHO 
Disability Schedule) is included in an appendix of ‘Emerging Measures and Models’ (thus 
implying that it is not yet to be used in standard clinical practice) (APA, 2013: 16, 23-24).  
One might wonder whether the loss of the multiaxial system is simply a change in formatting 
– what does it matter whether one records information on a variety of ‘axes’ or in a simple 
list? A clinician who recorded all psychiatric and non-psychiatric conditions, and also noted 
 14 
 
social and environmental problems, and made use of the WHO Disability Schedule, would 
end up recording much the same information as would have been recorded using DSM-IV, 
but in a different format. With the abandonment of the multiaxial system, however, there has 
been a clear shift in emphasis. The introduction to the DSM-IV gave the impression that a 
diligent clinician was expected to employ the multiaxial system.  Nine pages explained the 
system, and a suggested form was included that might be used to record information on all 
axes (APA, 1994: 25-34).  Now, although it is true clinicians can still record psychosocial 
and environmental problems, and that a disability assessment scale is included in an 
appendix, one gets the impression that clinicians are not really expected to record this 
information. The instructions telling clinicians that they may do so are buried in a single 
sentence in dense text, and are so poorly copy-edited that it is unclear whether or not the 
WHO Disability Schedule is intended for everyday clinical use (APA, 2013: 16). 
When revisions have been made to the actual sets of diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-
5 it is easy to track the rationale. At this level, for each revision, the responsible workgroups 
published papers explaining their proposals (either in published papers, or online on the 
DSM-5 revisions pages maintained by the APA)
2
. In contrast, it is much harder to track the 
rationale for changes to the DSM at the conceptual or structural level. At this level, 
explanations were seldom published.  
The multiaxial system was originally introduced with DSM-III (APA, 1980).  The basic 
system was maintained from DSM-III through to DSM-IV-TR. When the DSM-III was 
published, the multiaxial system was widely praised (Frances and Cooper, 1981). It was seen 
as implementing a biopsychosocial model of disorder; the clinicians’ attention was 
systematically directed towards biological, psychological, social and environmental factors. 
This thinking was maintained into DSM-IV where readers are told that ‘the multiaxial system 
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promotes the application of the biopsychosocial model in clinical, educational and research 
settings’ (APA, 1994: 25)  
During the development of the DSM-III and IV, the multiaxial approach played a key 
strategic role in addressing the concerns of those who feared that the DSM was an overly 
‘medical’, or ‘biological’, diagnostic system. Those who wished to emphasise the importance 
of environmental or social factors could be assured that a full DSM diagnosis would take 
such factors into account (Spitzer, 2001: 357). Axis IV required that psychosocial and 
environmental problems be considered. Axis II (although mainly used for personality 
disorders and mental retardation codes) could be used for recording ‘personality traits’, and 
from DSM-III-R onwards could also be used to note ‘defence mechanisms’ (APA, 1987: 16; 
1994: 27).   
The multiaxial system also kept open the possibility that with time the DSM might come to 
include more psychodynamic, social, or environmental information. Some thought that a new 
axis should be developed for defence mechanisms (Frances and Cooper, 1981; Skodol and 
Perry, 1997), others suggested an axis be added for relational functioning (Williams, 1997). 
These efforts met with some success, and the DSM-IV included these axes in an appendix 
titled ‘Axes provided for further study’ (APA, 1994: 751-759). 
The multiaxial system managed to partially accommodate psychodynamic, social and 
environmental concerns, but it did so in a way that simultaneously avoided threatening those 
who were happy to embrace a ‘medical’ or ‘biological’ approach to mental disorders.  While 
recording information on axes IV and V was encouraged, it was generally considered 
optional (Skodol, 1997). Thus the multiaxial system functioned to create liminal spaces in the 
DSM system.  Axes IV and V were not outside the system, but not quite in it either.   
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There are likely a number of reasons for the abandonment of the multiaxial system. The split 
between axis I and II caused a number of difficulties: Insurance companies often refused to 
reimburse for axis II disorders, and some hoped that doing away with axis II would make it 
easier for patients to secure coverage for therapy (Wakefield, 2013). There was also ongoing 
uncertainty about the placement of certain conditions, for example some argued that 
Borderline Personality Disorder should be moved to axis I (Gunderson, 2009).   
Still, it would have been possible to merge axes I and II, while retaining axes III, IV, and V, 
and so the difficulties with the axis I-axis II split cannot fully account for the abandonment of 
multiaxial system. Probst (2014) argues that the removal of axis IV may both reflect, and 
produce, a reduced interest in social and environmental factors. With the loss of axis II, 
which allowed defense styles to be recorded, psychodynamic factors have also been 
downplayed. A brief comment in a paper co-authored by Kupfer, chairman of the DSM-5 
committee, indirectly supports the suggestion that the abandonment of the multiaxial system 
signals a shift away from a biopsychosocial towards a more narrowly medical approach to 
mental disorder.  This paper notes that the multiaxial system was abandoned ‘…largely due 
to its incompatibility with diagnostic systems in the rest of medicine.’ (Kupfer, Kuhl and 
Regier, 2013). Given the history of the multiaxial system, it is reasonable to conclude that its 
abandonment goes along with a reduced emphasis on psychodynamic, social, relational and 
environmental approaches to mental disorder.   
 
ii. The definition of disorder 
Since DSM-III, the DSM has included a definition of mental disorder in the introduction.  In 
the DSM-IV definition there is a conceptual link between disorder and harm (or at least the 
risk of harm): 
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each of the mental disorders is conceptualised as a clinically significant 
behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a person and that 
is associated with present distress (a painful symptom) or disability (impairment 
in one or more important areas of functioning) or with significantly increased risk 
of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom…’ (APA, 
1994: xxi) 
In the DSM-5, however, there is a revised definition and the role of harm has been 
downgraded. The new definition states only that 
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in 
social, occupational, or other important activities. (APA 2013: 20, emphasis 
added) 
Following, this definition, someone who meets diagnostic criteria but who is not harmed (or 
at least at risk of harm) by their condition can now be diagnosed with a mental disorder. 
Potentially, this change is very significant. Many people have ‘symptoms’ suggestive of, for 
example, schizophrenia, or Asperger’s, or Tourette’s,  but are not harmed by their condition 
(nor at risk of harm). Such people do not have a mental disorder under the DSM-IV 
definition, but could under the DSM-5 definition. 
The idea that there is a conceptual link between mental disorders and harm (as per the DSM-
IV) became the dominant view amongst mental health professionals following the 1970s 
debates over homosexuality (Bayer, 1981). Homosexuality might turn out to be caused by 
some sort of evolutionary dysfunction. Still, a consensus developed that in so far as being gay 
is not harmful, homosexuality should not be considered a disorder. The DSM-IV definition of 
disorder acted to ensure that those who are different, but whose difference causes no harm, 
could not be given a diagnosis.  
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In the DSM-5 the definition of disorder was changed, but figuring out exactly how it came to 
be changed is not straightforward. There was no workgroup appointed to revise the definition 
of disorder, and no papers discussing or justifying the changes were published. The change to 
the introductory definition of disorder was made late on in the revision process and was little 
discussed.  
If we look at the drafts of the DSM-5 that were published online at various points as the 
edition was being put together,
3
 we can see that early drafts of the DSM-5 (from at least 
February 2010 to July 2010) included a definition of mental disorder that differed only 
slightly from that included in DSM-IV (this proposed definition is detailed in Stein et al., 
2010).  The possibility of a radical revision was first discussed in the DSM-5 draft available 
December 2011. This draft included two competing definitions of mental disorder, each 
developed by a different group. A note explained that a decision would be made later which 
definition to adopt. While the first proposed definition continued to be that presented in the 
earlier draft (a slight revision of the DSM-IV definition), the second proposed definition was 
very different. The second definition was developed by the Impairment and Disability 
Assessment Study Group, chaired by Jane Paulsen. In this definition, all reference to distress 
and impairment had been removed.  
The motivation of the Impairment and Disability Assessment Study Group was to bring the 
DSM definition of disorder in line with that implicit in the World Health Organization’s  
International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Alongside the ICD, the WHO also publishes a 
distinct classification, The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, 
which supplies codes for all forms of disability. The ICD conceives of disorder and disability 
as being quite distinct. According to the social model of disability, impairment and disability 
should be conceived of separately; impairment refers to the biological difference (e.g. having 
no legs), disability refers to problems in everyday living that are thought of as arising from 
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the social response to the impairment (Oliver, 1996). Following this logic, in the case of 
someone who, for  instance, hears voices but is not bothered by them and has a good life, the 
Impairment and Disability Assessment Study Group would say that the person has the 
disorder of schizophrenia (supposing that criteria for duration, etc., are met),
 4
 but is not 
disabled. 
 
The proposed changes to the definition of disorder attracted very little attention and were 
little discussed. Eventually, from June 2012, draft versions of the DSM-5 came to include 
something very close to the definition actually published in the DSM-5. In full, the new 
DSM-5 definition requires that: 
 
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant 
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behaviour that 
reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental 
processes underling mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated 
with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important 
activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or 
loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant 
behavior (e.g. political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily 
between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or 
conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above (APA, 
2013: 20) 
 
The published definition appears to be an uncomfortable compromise between a definition 
like the DSM-IV definition (which considers harm conceptually tied to disorder) and the 
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definition of the Impairment and Disability Assessment Study Group (which does not 
mention harm).  
 
It remains the case in the DSM-5 that many of the individual sets of diagnostic criteria 
include a requirement that the particular disorder can only be diagnosed if symptoms cause 
problems. There is often a criterion requiring that the symptoms cause ‘clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning’, or 
some such.  These criteria have mainly been inherited from DSM-IV. But the introduction to 
the DSM-5 makes it clear that these might be removed at some point in the future.  The 
introduction explains: 
 
There have been substantial efforts by the DSM-5 Task Force ... to separate the 
concepts of mental disorder and disability (impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning)... However, in the absence of clear 
biological markers or clinically useful measurements for severity for many mental 
disorders, it has not been possible to completely separate normal and pathological 
symptom expressions contained in diagnostic criteria. …Therefore, a generic 
diagnostic criterion requiring distress or disability has been used to establish 
disorder thresholds, usually worded ‘the disturbance causes clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or important areas of functioning’ 
(APA, 2013: 21) 
 
In DSM-5, the idea that certain disorders cause distress or impairment is included in 
diagnostic criteria only pending the development of some better means of drawing the line 
between the normal and the pathological. The DSM-5 thinks of references to harm as only 
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being necessary, for the time being, because science is as yet underdeveloped. Harm is no 
longer considered conceptually necessary for diagnosis.  
 
iii. Descriptive approach abandoned 
 
The DSM-III set out to be a purely descriptive, atheoretical classification system (except in 
the case of conditions with established causes, such as the organic mental disorders). In the 
DSM-IV, the claim to be atheoretical was quietly dropped, but the structure and contents of 
the classification remained much as they had been in DSM-III. Now, with the DSM-5, the 
classification aims to be based on theoretical knowledge about aetiology. 
The reasons that the DSM-III set out to adopt a descriptive, atheoretical stance have already 
been partly discussed. When the classification was being developed, in the mid to late 1970s, 
there was much concern with improving the reliability of diagnosis.  The adoption of 
‘operational definitions’, which sought to set out the symptoms required for diagnosis in 
language that was as descriptive as possible, was seen as a way of dealing with the problem 
of reliability (see eg. Kendell, 1975). In addition, at the time, mental health professionals in 
the US worked under a range of different paradigms. In particular psychoanalysis remained 
an important approach. Making the DSM-III atheoretical was presented as a means by which 
the classification could be rendered acceptable to those working in a range of different 
paradigms (APA, 1980: 7) 
 
Following the publication of the DSM-III, the claim that the classification was atheoretical 
came in for much criticism. Commentators pointed out that the DSM-III is not, in fact, purely 
descriptive. Many of the diagnostic criteria require theory-laden inferences to be made, such 
as ‘identity disturbance’, which is a symptom of Borderline Personality Disorder (Cooper and 
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Michels, 1981). Many DSM diagnoses contain exclusion clauses. Agoraphobia, for example, 
can only be diagnosed if the symptoms cannot be better explained by a major depressive 
episode or schizophrenia. These disorders are thought to be more ‘deep-rooted’ than that 
underlying agoraphobia, and so trump an agoraphobia diagnosis (Cooper, 2005: 78). A 
different line of criticism has taken a more conceptual path. Philosophers of science 
commonly hold that observation is theory-laden, and that thus no classification can be theory-
free (Kuhn, 1970; Quine, 1960).  
 
In the DSM-IV the introduction quietly dropped the claim to be atheoretical. Possibly this 
was under the influence of its chairman, Allen Frances, who had criticised the DSM-III’s 
claim to be atheoretical on the basis that observation is always theory-laden (Frances and 
Cooper, 1981: 1199; Frances et al., 1990) Still, the DSM-IV is very clearly a descendent of 
DSM-III. Many sets of diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-IV remain the same as in the 
DSM-III, and new criteria sets follow the same style as those that have been inherited.  
 
The DSM-5 sought to take a different approach. As discussed in section 1 the classification 
set out to be moulded by theories about aetiology.  In particular, a body of work focussed on 
the ‘metastructure’ of the DSM. The idea was that disorders would be grouped together in a 
way that provided information about their nature.  
 
Early on in the revision process there were indications that the structure of the classification 
might be over-hauled. A subgroup of the DSM-5 Task Force worked on the ‘metastructure’ 
and a special issue of Psychological Medicine published their proposals. It was suggested that 
the DSM-5 might be reorganized into a number of clusters reflecting ‘aetiological risk 
factors’ (Andrews et al., 2009: 1999).  Five clusters were proposed – 1. neurocognitive 
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(grouping delirium, dementias, amnesic and other cognitive disorders), 2. 
neurodevelopmental (grouping mental retardation, learning, motor skills and communication 
disorders, and pervasive developmental disorders), 3. psychosis (grouping schizophrenia , 
bipolar disorder, schizotypal personality disorder),  4. emotional (a large grouping, including 
unipolar depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorders, and avoidant personality 
disorder), and 5. externalising (including substance-related disorders, antisocial personality 
disorder, and impulse –control disorders). Most disorders fell outside these clusters and 
formed a final cluster, ‘disorders not yet assigned’. 
 
Following the papers setting out the Task Force proposal, the special issue published a 
number of commentaries. These were uniformly negative in their assessment (First, 2009; 
Jablensky, 2009; Wittchen et al., 2009). The proposal was criticised on the basis that it lacked 
adequate empirical support; too many conditions were unassigned; and some of the proposed 
groupings departed radically from clinical tradition (the personality disorders, for example, 
were to be split between distinct groups).  
The idea of a radical restructuring was abandoned. But some of these ideas made it into the 
DSM-5, albeit in diluted form. As the introduction makes clear, the ordering of disorders is 
now intended to convey information about supposed aetiology.  
The proposed organization of chapters of DSM-5, after the neurodevelopmental 
disorders, is based on groups of internalizing (emotional and somatic) disorders, 
externalizing disorders, neurocognitive disorders, and other disorders. It is hoped 
that this organization will encourage further study of underlying 
pathophysiological processes that give rise to diagnostic comorbidity and 
symptom heterogeneity (APA, 2013:13) 
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In actual implementation, the changes that have been made to the DSM on the basis of 
aetiological theories are extremely subtle and I suspect they will be missed by most readers. 
There are no headings that make it clear that ‘internalising’ and ‘externalising’ conditions are 
being grouped together.  Those aspects of the proposal that would have resulted in a 
classification that diverged sharply with tradition have been avoided; antisocial personality 
disorder, for example, is an ‘externalizing disorder’ but remains with the personality 
disorders, where it has always been. Those changes that have been made are modest, for 
example, the chapter on ‘Disruptive, impulse-control and conduct disorders’ has been moved 
to be next to ‘Substance-related and addictive disorders’, so that these ‘externalising’ 
disorders are together. Antisocial personality disorder how appears in both the personality 
disorder section and under ‘Disruptive, impulse-control and conduct disorders’. Changes of 
this type are insignificant in themselves. But they do show that there has been a profound 
reconceptualization of the DSM. Once, the classification set out to be descriptive and 
atheoretical, now it seeks to reflect theoretical knowledge. 
 
 
iv. The role of values 
In the DSM-5 revision, for the first time, the potential of the classification to produce harm 
(via facilitating stigma, over-treatment, and so on) was considered in an explicit and 
systematic way. Guidelines for those proposing new diagnoses required a consideration of 
whether ‘…the harm that arises from the adoption of the proposed diagnosis exceed[s] the 
benefit that would accrue to affected individuals’ (Kendler et al., 2009: 6), 
In contrast, when the DSM-IV was developed, although the harms that the system could 
cause were sometimes considered, this was only in a limited and piecemeal way.
 5
  In the 
construction of the DSM-IV the key rhetorical themes were empirical evidence and 
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transparency.  Guidelines for DSM-IV workgroups emphasised that proposals for change had 
to be supported by comprehensive and systematic reviews of empirical evidence (Frances, 
Widiger and Pincus, 1989; Widiger et al, 1991).
 
An accompanying four volume Sourcebook 
(each volume of which runs to about 1000 pages) published the literature reviews that had 
been undertaken by the various workgroups to document the support for changes to the 
classification (APA, 1994: xx). The guidelines for workgroups made no mention of the harms 
that revisions might cause. 
6
 
Those developing the DSM-IV considered their responsibilities to be limited. Allen Frances, 
chairman of the DSM-IV, wrote, 
It is unclear to what extent the DSM-IV task force should be influenced by the 
effects its decision might have beyond the immediate clinical domains for which 
the system is designed. To ignore obvious detrimental effects would be 
irresponsible, but for DSM-IV to have credibility as a system of diagnosis its 
clinical uses and foundations in research must have priority (Frances et al., 1990: 
1442) 
Conceptually, in this period the harms that diagnosis can cause were generally characterised 
as stemming from ‘misuse’.  Talk of ‘misuse’ implies that harm might result when the DSM 
was used inappropriately.  The idea seemed to be that various bad or irresponsible types – 
maybe the marketing departments of pharmaceutical companies, or overly zealous lawyers – 
might potentially exploit the letter of the diagnostic criteria of the DSM in ways that departed 
from its spirit. Those writing the DSM-IV sought to be careful in their choice of wording to 
avoid such possibilities.  
Prior to publication of the DSM-IV, an Options Book was published, which contained details 
of the changes that were being proposed. The introduction explains that  
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The provision of an Options Book at this time will help ensure that we are 
receiving the widest possible input of data and opinion and that we are not 
missing inconsistencies, errors, or potential for misuse (Task Force on DSM-IV, 
1991: A.1)  
The Options Book included a form for readers to note any problems they found in the text and 
to send it to the APA. Some readers did report errors and possible problems. I have visited 
the archives of the American Psychiatric Association and seen some of the materials related 
to development of the DSM-IV. The files do contain some returned forms, with notes of 
problems and suggested solutions. Note, however, that the Options Book accords identifying 
‘potential for misuse’ a rather low priority. Readers are asked to report concerns about 
potential harms alongside copy-editing errors. 
In contrast, when the DSM-5 was being developed, the potential for harm was systematically 
considered. Guidelines for revisions to DSM-5 asked those proposing new diagnoses to 
consider whether ‘…the harm that arises from the adoption of the proposed diagnosis 
exceed[s] the benefit that would accrue to affected individuals’ (Kendler et al., 2009: 6), and 
potential for harm was cited as a possible reason for keeping a diagnosis in the appendix 
rather than promoting it to the main classification (Kendler et al., 2009: 9). Significantly, in 
these guidelines harm is seen as potentially resulting from proper use of the DSM and not just 
from ‘misuse’. The aim now was to try and ensure that the DSM was designed such that 
diagnoses based on the DSM on balance do more good than harm. 
Workgroups developing proposals for the DSM-5 did seek to demonstrate that their proposed 
revisions would bring about more good than harm. The ‘do no harm’ criterion was referred to 
in many papers arguing for or against proposed revisions to the DSM-5 (e.g. Boelen and 
Prigerson, 2012; Huprich, 2012; Mataix-Cols et al., 2010; Selby  et al., 2012; Woods et al., 
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2010). Benefits that were commonly expected from proposed revisions included the 
facilitation of appropriate treatment and other needed services, providing a category useful 
for future research, and improving clinical communication. Types of harm that were 
commonly considered included stigmatisation and self-stigmatisation,  the inappropriate 
treatment of false-positives, legal and bureaucratic consequences, and the potential 
medicalization of normality.  
In the DSM-5, the requirement that harm be considered was limited in scope. Considerations 
of harm were only explicitly required from those proposing to introduce new diagnoses, or to 
move diagnoses from the appendix to the main classification. Still, presumably, if 
considerations of harm should play a role in assessing these types of proposed revision, there 
is no principled reason why they should not also play a role in evaluating other types of 
proposed revision (such as proposals for name changes, for lumping or splitting categories, or 
for altering diagnostic criteria).  
In the DSM-5 for the first time it was accepted that proper use of the DSM can produce harm 
and that this is something that those writing the DSM should systematically consider. The 
classification shifted from being one that presented itself as being based foremost on 
empirical evidence to one that was developed on the basis of both empirical evidence and 









We have seen how the conceptual underpinnings of the DSM-5 differ from those of the 
DSM-IV in important ways. Table 1 summarises the main differences. In summarising the 
main differences, various nuances, discussed above, have been ignored in the interests of 
clarity. 
 
Conceptual differences between DSM-IV and 5 
  DSM-IV DSM-5 
Model of disorder Multiaxial system 
operationalised a 
biopsychosocial approach 
Non-axial system fits with a 
more narrowly medical 
approach 
Definition of mental disorder Value-laden. ‘Disorder’ is 
conceptually tied to harm. 
Value-free. A ‘disorder’ need 
not cause harm. 
Link with theories of 
aetiology. 
Largely descriptive. Seeks to be guided by 
aetiological theories. 
Role of values in revisions First and foremost based on 
empirical evidence.  
Based on empirical evidence 









In section 1 I argued that the sets of diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-5 remain much 
as they were in DSM-IV – at this level the system has become locked-in. In section 2 I 
argued that at the conceptual level there are important changes between the DSM-IV and 
DSM-5. This raises two questions. How can the DSM be locked-in at the level of diagnostic 
criteria, but flexible at the conceptual level? And, what is the relationship between the 
conceptual framework of the DSM and the sets of diagnostic criteria it contains such that 
radical changes can occur at the conceptual level but have little impact on the actual 
diagnostic criteria? 
Understanding how the DSM is used and written is key to addressing these two questions. 
Fundamentally, the reason it has become hard to revise the diagnostic criteria included in the 
DSM is that diverse users employ these criteria. If diagnoses are added or removed from the 
classification, or diagnostic criteria are revised, people notice and care. The diverse users 
have different requirements, and it is hard to revise the classification in such a way that these 
requirements continue to be met.  
Plausibly, most users read only those portions of the DSM that they directly use.
7
 The 
introduction, in particular, will likely pass unread. And, the introduction, of course, is the part 
of the book that outlines the conceptual framework.  As a consequence, most readers will not 
know or care how the DSM defines disorder, or whether concerns about harm are considered, 
or whether the classification seeks to be based on theoretical knowledge.  
The conceptual framework of the DSM is of little interest to most users, and it has also been 
of little interest to those who develop the classification. The various sections of the 
classification had workgroups assigned to them. These workgroups published and presented 
their proposals, which were intensely scrutinised and discussed. Multiple conferences and 
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journal issues were devoted to discussion of proposed revisions for autism-related conditions, 
or ADHD, for example. In contrast, few committees were appointed to consider issues 
connected to the conceptual framework. In her article on the demise of Axis IV, Barbara 
Probst notes, 
The paucity of APA resources assigned to the issue both reflected and determined 
its perceived unimportance; something that did not even merit its own Work 
Group could not inspire dialogue (Probst, 2014: 6). 
Where committees did work on conceptual issues, such issues were accorded low priority. 
Proposals to revise the definition of disorder, for example, were made available late and little 
discussed.  By the time the definition of mental disorder was decided almost all the sets of 
diagnostic criteria were already in close to their final form. I suggest that those who have 
revised the conceptual framework of the DSM have been free to make revisions partly 
because very few people have known, or cared, about the revisions. 
The question of how it is that the conceptual framework of the DSM can shift without this 
affecting its contents remains to be addressed. In addressing this issue, we must consider each 
conceptual change in turn. Let’s first consider the loss of the multiaxial system. I have argued 
that the multiaxial system of the DSM-IV can be understood as implementing a 
biopsychosocial model of disorder. The DSM-5, in contrast, has abandoned the multiaxial 
system and has a more narrowly medical model of disorder. This is an important conceptual 
change. But it is not one that could be expected to affect the sets of diagnostic criteria.  In 
DSM-IV the diagnostic criteria were used for Axes I and Axes II. They in effect coded the 
‘medical’ bit of a multiaxial (biopsychosocial) DSM-IV diagnosis. This information 
continues to be routinely collected, and so the sets of diagnostic criteria remain unaffected.  
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The DSM-III sought to be a descriptive, atheoretical classification. The DSM-IV dropped the 
philosophical claims, but continued in the same vein. In contrast, DSM-5 set out to reflect 
theories about aetiology. This is an important conceptual shift. It has had little impact on the 
sets of diagnostic criteria, however, partly because there is not yet sufficient theoretical 
knowledge available for many changes to have been motivated. 
In the DSM-5, for the first time, the potential for the DSM to produce harm was 
systematically considered. A committee was put in place to make sure that all proposals for 
adding or deleting conditions included a consideration of the potential harms that might ensue 
(Yager and Mcintyre, 2014). However, this has only had a modest impact on the sets of 
diagnostic criteria included because the guidelines only required that harm be considered 
when disorders were suggested for inclusion or deletion. Relatively few such changes were 
suggested, and so the altered stance has had relatively little effect. 
Finally, the DSM-5 uses a different definition of mental disorder than did earlier editions. 
Disorder is no longer conceptually tied to harm. Potentially, this is an important revision. If 
taken seriously, it would mean that people who tic, or hear voices, or avoid social interaction, 
but who lead flourishing lives could be diagnosed with Tourette’s, or schizophrenia, or ASD. 
In actual fact there has been no such impact. The definition of disorder was produced too late 
to feed into other committee processes.  
For the work of various DSM committees to fail to connect is not that unusual.
8
 The DSM is 
constructed by multiple committees. The committees work semi-independently. A Task Force 
provides some oversight, but the degree of independence is sufficient for distinct groups to 
end up with divergent ideas, such that when their work is patched together to form the overall 
text the joins show. Either the overall text becomes inconsistent, or last minute compromises 
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 Papers in the DSM-III and DSM-IV archives reveal much concern with press coverage. 
 
2
 These pages have now been removed but can still be located using the internet archive, The 
Wayback Machine, by searching for http://dsm5.org 
 
3
 These have now been removed by the American Psychiatric Association but can still be 
located using the internet archive, The Wayback Machine, by searching for http://dsm5.org 
 
4
 In contrast to the DSM-IV position, the ICD has always allowed for schizophrenia to be 
diagnosed in the absence of disability or distress. 
 
5
 Sometimes the DSM-IV came to be shaped by concerns about possible harms. For example, 
the Child Disorders workgroup worried about the potential for ADHD to be over diagnosed, 
and worried that ‘subsuming oppositional defiant disorder under conduct disorder may be 
unnecessarily stigmatizing’ (Shaffer, Widiger and Pincus, 1998, quote p.968). 
 
6
 A later chapter by Pincus (2012) cites the guidelines for revision (Frances, Widiger and 
Pincus, 1989) and says they included a step ‘Consider and delineate risks and benefits of each 
option’, which makes it sound like harms might have been systematically considered. But in 
Frances, Widiger and Pincus (1989) there is no mention of any such step. 
7
 Few studies have been conducted that show how the DSM is employed in practice. Those 
that have been conducted are mainly fairly old, but suggest that users of the DSM tend to 
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consult it on a need-to-know basis and tend not to read it very carefully. For a review of such 
studies see Mullins-Sweatt, Lengel & DeShong (2016).  
 
8
 Consider, for example, the DSM-5 stance on Bipolar Disorder in children. A proposal for a 
distinct code for Paediatric bipolar disorder was rejected. Instead, Disruptive mood 
dysregulation disorder was introduced in the Depressive Disorders chapter.  But elsewhere in 
the DSM, in the bipolar chapter, the text advises that ‘Other specified bipolar and related 
disorder’ might be used to diagnose children with bipolar-like phenomena (APA, 2013:123).  
